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COURT CAPTURE 
J. JONAS ANDERSON* 
Abstract: Capture—the notion that a federal agency can become controlled by 
the industry the agency is supposed to be regulating—is a fundamental concern 
for administrative law scholars. Surprisingly, however, no thorough treatment of 
how capture theory applies to the federal judiciary has been done. The few 
scholars who have attempted to apply the insights of capture theory to federal 
courts have generally concluded that the federal courts are insulated from cap-
ture concerns.  
This Article challenges the notion that the federal courts cannot be captured. It 
makes two primary arguments. As an initial matter, this Article makes the the-
oretical case that federal courts can be captured. Expanding upon the regulato-
ry capture literature and what literature exists about the capture of courts, this 
Article demonstrates that the institutional safeguards often thought to shield 
judges from special interest influence (including political independence, life-
time tenure, and general jurisdiction) may, in some cases, break down, leaving 
courts exposed to capture in much the same way as agencies.  
Then, this Article turns to the application of the theoretical argument. It focus-
es on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the district that 
until recently received the most patent cases of any district court in the coun-
try. The Eastern District of Texas exhibits many classic signs of capture, in-
cluding a revolving door between the federal bench and law firms, the re-
gion’s economic dependence on litigation, and a mutually beneficial relation-
ship between the plaintiffs’ bar and the Eastern District judges. In conclusion, 
this Article urges Congress to tighten venue requirements and to mandate ran-
dom assignment of judges. These proposals would better protect the U.S. fed-
eral courts from capture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Capture is a concern of scholars studying the administrative state.1 
Traditionally, capture is thought to occur when an agency becomes too cozy 
with an industry that it regulates.2 For example, capture might result from a 
revolving door between the industry and government, putting regulators in 
the awkward position of regulating a future or past employer.3 Or capture 
may occur when the government agency develops personal relationships 
with members of the industry such that the agency’s regulatory decisions 
become suspect.4 Alternatively, capture can result from an agency being 
overwhelmed with information (usually provided by the regulated indus-
tries) such that the agency’s ability to make informed decisions is compro-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (“The principal pathology emphasized [by scholars] during these years 
was ‘capture,’ meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination 
by the industry they were charged with regulating.”); see also Christopher Carrigan, Captured by 
Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill, in PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 239, 239 (Daniel 
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013) (identifying capture as being partially responsible for the 
recent BP oil spill); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Inter-
est, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 167 (1990) (detailing 
the rise of “capture theory”); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (proposing a supply and demand model for regulation). But see 
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 215–16 
(1976) (arguing that regulators who appear to have been “captured” may in fact simply be a result 
of efficient regulations which maximize profits and minimize prices). 
 2 Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir. 1988) (describing agency capture 
as the “undesirable scenario where the regulated industry gains influence over the regulators, and 
the regulators end up serving the interests of the industry, rather than the general public”). See 
generally Samuel P. Harrington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and 
the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952) (discussing potential capture concerns with the inter-
state commerce commission); Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34 (1993) (arguing that Superfund contractors have captured the Superfund 
program); Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12 (2013), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/
online/dodd-frank-regulators-cost-benefit-analysis-and-agency-capture/ [https://perma.cc/HEU4-
E3CB] (speculating that Dodd-Frank regulators are vulnerable to capture); Luigi Zingales, Pre-
venting Economists’ Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST IN-
FLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 1, at 124 (reviewing traditional capture stories). 
 3 See, e.g., LOUIS M. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS: WATCHDOG AGENCIES AND THE PUB-
LIC INTEREST 49–54 (1969) (describing the behavior of employees going back and forth between 
federal agencies and industry jobs). 
 4 See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS (2011) (employing “cultural capture” theory to explain the 
2008 financial crisis). 
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mised.5 Regardless of how it occurs, capture is a major concern for scholars 
of administrative agencies.6 
Yet legal scholars have not generally applied the theory of capture to 
federal courts.7 This lack of scholarship is somewhat understandable. After 
all, the judiciary has safeguards that protect judges from outside influence, 
safeguards that are not found in federal agencies.8 For example, judicial 
salaries are constitutionally protected and are not linked to approval of the 
executive or legislative branches.9 Agency employees enjoy no such guar-
antee.10 Moreover a judge’s employment is not dependent on the approval 
of highly influential outsiders, like the President.11 On the other hand, most 
agencies serve some other branch of government. Furthermore, judicial eth-
ical rules limit the ability of an industry to exert influence over judges.12 It 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329–34 (2010) (proposing the theory of “information capture”). 
 6 Administrative scholars have proposed numerous innovative solutions for recognizing and 
ferreting out capture. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (identifying five equalizing factors that 
are well-suited to address the problem of capture); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Poli-
tics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 
(1991) (proposing an agency charged with searching for regulatory capture). 
 7 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of 
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 827 (applying public choice theory to judges and 
concluding that the theory has little value with respect to judges because of institutional structures 
that constrain judges from becoming captured); Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus 
Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VS. LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES 
FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 11, 19–20 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010) (stating that judges are “less 
likely” to be captured than agencies). 
 8 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 7, at 844–45 (concluding that judges are restrained from mis-
behavior by “a powerful set of constraints”). 
 9 See Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1104, 1156 (1976) (recalling the colonial experience with judicial independence and stating 
that the constitutional guarantee of judicial salaries assured independence from the executive). 
 10 In fact, Congress recently enacted legislation that allows it to cut any federal employee’s 
pay, not just individual government programs’ overall budget. See Jenna Portnoy & Lisa Rein, 
House Republicans Revive Obscure Rule That Allows Them to Slash the Pay of Individual Federal 
Workers to $1, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/
house-republicans-revive-obscure-rule-that-could-allow-them-to-slash-the-pay-of-individual-federal-
workers-to-1/2017/01/04/4e80c990-d2b2-11e6-945a-76f69a399dd5_story.html?utm_term=.104fa
177955d [https://perma.cc/SE7B-YDCF]. 
 11 See Smith, supra note 9, at 1156 (recalling the colonial experience with judicial independ-
ence and stating that the constitutional guarantee of judicial salaries assured independence from 
the executive). 
 12 See Roger E. Hartley, “It’s Called Lunch”: Judicial Ethics and the Political and Legal Space 
for the Judiciary to “Lobby,” 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 399–400 (2014) (reciting the judicial code of 
conduct forbidding judges from engaging with lobbyists). 
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is largely for this reason—the institutional safeguards against capture of the 
judiciary—that court capture has been largely ignored by scholars.13 
This Article argues that courts are not always protected from capture. It 
critiques the literature on court capture and demonstrates that the institu-
tional safeguards thought to protect judges from capture by special interests 
do not always exist. In fact, when the institutional safeguards break down, 
federal courts are exposed to capture in much the same manner as are the 
federal agencies that they review. 
But, to understand how court capture can occur, some definition of what 
court capture looks like is necessary. Extant literature on regulatory capture 
provides the proper framework for talking about court capture. This literature 
on regulatory capture can be divided into two separate, but related, strains. 
The first deals with the traditional capture threat: personal benefits.14 Here, 
regulators are influenced in their decision-making by the chance of personal 
gain, through bribes or future job opportunities offered by the regulated in-
dustry.15 Relatedly, regulators may be captured through threats from the regu-
lated industry: the regulator’s current job may be threatened, or her agency is 
faced with defunding if certain decisions are not made.16 This strain of cap-
ture literature has its roots in public choice theory, which envisions regulators 
as rational, profit-seeking individuals.17 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 7, at 827 (applying public choice theory to judges and con-
cluding that the theory has little value with respect to judges because of “institutional strengths” 
that constrain judges from becoming captured); Posner, supra note 7, at 19 (stating that judges are 
“less likely” to be captured than agencies). 
 14 See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 6, at 1090–91 (arguing that interest groups have five pri-
mary means to influence government policy: bribes, future employment for government decision-
makers, personal relationships with government workers, refraining from criticizing the govern-
ment, and political contributions). 
 15 Id.; see also Barkow, supra note 6, at 46–47 (stating that the revolving door “is often cited 
as one of the reasons why the SEC failed” to police financial industries during the economic cri-
sis); Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
689, 689–93 (1986) (discussing the evidence of revolving door capture at the FCC). 
 16 Various sources provide more detail on iron-triangle style capture. See Peltzman, supra 
note 1, at 215–16 (constructing early versions of iron-triangle capture); Stigler, supra note 1, at 3 
(constructing early versions of iron-triangle capture); see also GORDON ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF 
DEFENSE CONTRACTING: THE IRON TRIANGLE 81 (1981). See generally LAWRENCE C. DODD & 
RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 103 (1979) (discussing the 
implications of the administrative state and iron-triangles); B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WA-
TERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 18–28 
(1994) (discussing empirical controversies in the clash between politics and bureaucracy and the 
principal-agent model of bureaucracy); Harrington, supra note 2 (discussing potential capture 
concerns with the interstate commerce commission). 
 17 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1988) (describing agency cap-
ture as an off-shoot of public choice theory). 
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The second strain of regulatory capture literature considers regulators 
to be driven by something other than their own pecuniary interests. This 
strain theorizes that capture is not always the result of regulators seeking 
personal benefits. Instead, capture may result from regulators making poor 
regulatory decisions because they lack good information about the conse-
quences of those decisions.18 Because the regulator often must rely upon the 
regulated industry to provide the data necessary for effective decision-
making, the regulator is at the mercy of the regulated industry.19 Similarly, 
personal relationships between industry and the agency have been theorized 
to lead to capture.20 Although regulators may not consciously make decisions 
that a particular industry desires, they can nevertheless be captured because 
their social acquaintances are from, or at least support, the industry.21 
So how does this literature apply to the federal courts? Scholars gener-
ally assume that there are two primary institutional safeguards protecting 
federal courts from capture: political independence and the generalized ju-
risdiction of the federal judiciary.22 Political independence of the judiciary 
is thought to protect judges from capture because judges are not directly 
responsive to the President or Congress, and therefore are far more difficult 
to capture than employees of federal agencies.23 By lobbying and funding 
the election campaigns of Congressman and the President, special interests 
can gain influence over the funding of agencies.24 Judges, however, are not 
elected and therefore operate independently of outside influence.25 
But judicial independence does not eliminate all forms of capture. Just 
because judges are politically independent of the other branches of govern-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1321–22 (describing “information capture” as interest groups 
overwhelming the administrative system with complex information which leads to decision-
making processes occurring in the dark). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 4 at 163–75 (using “cultural capture” theory to 
partially explain the 2008 financial crisis). 
 21 See id. 
 22 There is little robust commentary about the place of capture on federal courts. The most 
thorough treatments, without exception, conclude that the federal courts are in little danger of 
being captured. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 7, at 827 (applying public choice theory to judges 
and concluding that the theory has little value with respect to judges because of “institutional 
constraints” that prevent judges from becoming captured); Posner, supra note 7, at 19–20 (stating 
that judges unlikely to be captured). 
 23 See infra notes 220–250 and accompanying text (discussing the evidence of court capture); 
see also Posner, supra note 7, at 20 (“Federal judges have . . . far more autonomy (in particular, 
insulation from political and interest-group pressures) than regulators, and . . . [this] advantage[] 
result[s] in a higher average quality of judicial than of regulatory appointees.”). 
 24 See Stigler, supra note 1, at 3 (making the case that agencies may be captured because of 
pressure from elected officials). 
 25 Posner, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
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ment does not mean that they will not fall prey to other forms of capture 
that scholars have identified, including information capture, cultural cap-
ture, and revolving door capture.26 Judicial independence merely guarantees 
that a court cannot be captured through another branch of government; it 
does nothing to protect judges from direct special interests influence. Thus, 
judicial independence provides some protection against some forms of cap-
ture, but it does not prevent court capture generally. 
Life tenure, another aspect of judicial independence, is also thought to 
protect judges from capture.27 Federal judges are appointed for life, thereby 
presumably closing any revolving door between industry and the courts.28 
Judges are paid the same amount regardless of expertise, speed, or outcome 
so, it is thought, there is little financial incentive to skew decisions in favor of 
one industry.29 Life tenure is also supposed to shelter federal judges from the 
political whims of the time.30 Furthermore, ethical limitations insulate the 
judiciary from accepting gifts from lobbyists or other interested parties.31 
The position of federal judge, however, is not the lifetime calling it 
once was. Federal judges receive life tenure, but more and more judges are 
retiring early from the bench.32 In fact, many federal judges retire to enter 
into the more financially lucrative world of law firms or mediation.33 This 
means that instead of embarking on a lifetime of public service once they 
ascend to the bench, some judges are serving the public for a time before 
entering the corporate world.34 This raises concerns about revolving door 
capture. Judges might be biased (consciously or otherwise) toward a pro-
spective future employer. 
Scholars have theorized that the generalized nature of judging makes 
the federal judiciary a far less appealing target for special interest than 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 152–175 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 177–194 and accompanying text. 
 28 Epstein, supra note 7, at 833–35; see Posner, supra note 7, at 19–20 (asserting that life 
tenure for judges makes them superior to agency personnel who do not have guaranteed perma-
nent employment). 
 29 See Epstein, supra note 7, at 836 (“Judges are cut off from the usual sources of market and 
political gain. Their behavior should reflect their relative isolation, even under the self-interest 
hypothesis.”). 
 30 Id. at 834 (“[J]udges are insulated from the more obvious demands of the political process 
. . . .”). 
 31 Id. (stating that it is clear that judges cannot “practice law, work for business corporations, 
or lobby Congress”) (citations omitted). For an argument that federal judges do in fact lobby Con-
gress, see generally J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REV. 401 (2016). 
 32 Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945–
2000, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1049 n.72 (2003). 
 33 See infra notes 220–250 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 220–250 and accompanying text. 
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agencies.35 Because cases can theoretically be filed in any of the ninety-four 
federal district courts across the country, the value of capturing one district 
court is far less valuable than capturing the one agency in charge of regulat-
ing an industry.36 This argument is less about judges being protected from 
capture and more about judges being less inviting to those interested in cap-
ture. By allowing many courts to hear many cases, general jurisdiction pro-
tects judges from capture by making judges unappealing as capture targets. 
Despite this “capture protection” offered by general jurisdiction, spe-
cialization among federal judges is increasing.37 Judicial capture has been a 
concern for scholars of specialized courts, who see it as one of the down-
sides of creating courts that hear specialized cases.38 Even for generalist 
federal courts, specialization is on the rise. Many federal courts have recent-
ly begun to compete for particular types of cases.39 They have done this in a 
variety of ways, but perhaps the most successful way is by leaving the liti-
gant the option of choosing the judge who will preside over the case. This 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Why Aren’t Regulation and Litigation Substitutes? An 
Examination of the Capture Hypothesis, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFI-
DENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 231–32 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012) (stating that the odds of captur-
ing all judges who could hear a particular case makes judicial capture, at first glance, undesirable). 
As opposed to the general jurisdiction of most of the federal judiciary, courts with specialized 
dockets have been scrutinized for capture. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 684–740 (3d ed. 1994); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ 
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and 
Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1024 & nn.99–100 (1999) (noting that the Fed-
eral Circuit is more “pro-patent” than its predecessor courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17–20, 25–26 (1989) 
(describing Federal Circuit’s sensitivity to patent policy and resulting pro-patent owner stance in 
substantive issues as well as improved availability of remedies and preliminary injunctive relief); 
Lawrence G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 13 (1991); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 
37 IDEA 545, 545 (1997) (noting that the Federal Circuit is overwhelmingly pro-patent); Allan N. 
Littman, The Jury’s Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: Markman, Hilton Davis, and 
Beyond, 37 IDEA 207, 209 (1997) (“Patent lawyers have perceived both juries and the Federal 
Circuit to be pro-patent.”) (citations omitted); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent 
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (noting the 
Federal Circuit’s pro-patent reputation). 
 36 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 176–193 and accompanying text. 
 38 See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS (2011) (explaining that courts 
have become increasingly specialized and that this specialization has led to changes in judicial 
policy).  
 39 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 667 
(2015) [hereinafter Anderson, Court Competition] (describing how courts can effectively “com-
pete” for cases); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV 241, 255–60 
(2016) (theorizing that courts can offer their forums to plaintiffs). See generally J. Jonas Ander-
son, Judge Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 539 (2016) (describing 
how the Eastern District of Texas has become the center of patent cases via “judge shopping”). 
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phenomenon of “court competition” for cases may, in some cases, create 
particularly appealing targets for capture, even amongst the generalized 
federal courts.40 
The second contribution of this Article to the capture literature will be 
to apply the theory of court capture to modern day courts. In doing so, this 
Article focuses on the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Texas. The Eastern District of Texas has become a hotbed of patent liti-
gation, receiving over one-third of the patent cases filed in the United States 
in 2015.41 But there are some indications that the court has been captured by 
special interests. A proverbial revolving door has developed between the 
federal bench and local patent law firms, raising concerns about the influ-
ence of those firms on future decisions of the court. Furthermore, East Tex-
as benefits economically from the influx of patent litigation coming to its 
courthouses. Such benefits have cultural capture implications for the court. 
The story of the Eastern District of Texas sheds light on the largest dif-
ference between regulatory capture and court capture. Court capture differs 
from agency capture in who is doing the capturing: in agency capture it is 
the regulated industries, whereas in court capture it is the litigation industry, 
and, more specifically plaintiff attorneys.42 These attorneys, much like in-
dustry in regulatory capture, seek favorable judgments and predictable pro-
cedures from certain courts or judges.43 
Although the specter of court capture likely cannot be eliminated, there 
are some common-sense approaches that would reduce the special interest 
influence on courts such as the Eastern District of Texas. The most obvious 
approach would be to tighten venue rules in federal court. Strengthening 
venue requirements limits courts’ ability to attract particular cases to their 
courtrooms. This limited ability to attract cases also makes courts far less 
appealing as targets of capture.44 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
TC Heartland v. Kraft Food Brand Groups is a positive step in this direc-
tion, although Congress should do more to limit venue where court are 
competing for cases. 
This Article also proposes mandatory random case assignment for eve-
ry federal court. This will force courts to assign every case randomly and 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See, e.g., Anderson, Court Competition, supra note 39, at 667. 
 41 Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases, 
MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-small-town-
judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases [https://perma.cc/22TQ-Q9PK]. 
 42 See Dreyfuss, supra note 35, at 3 (summarizing arguments about the potential for special-
ized courts to be captured “by the bar that regularly practices before them”). 
 43 Id. 
 44See Anderson, Court Competition, supra note 39 at 637 (proposing restricting venue as a 
way to reduce court competition). 
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eliminate the judge shopping, which is yet another way districts compete for 
cases. Successfully attracting cases to a district is likely also attract captur-
ers. Fundamentally, these suggested changes have a common purpose: they 
seek to strengthen the traditional judicial checks against capture.45 
Part I of this Article reviews the literature about regulatory capture. 
Then, it introduces the theory of court capture and discusses why the same 
forces that enable regulatory capture can work on courts. Part II turns to 
application of the theory, focusing on the recent rise of the Eastern District 
of Texas as a patent litigation hotbed. Part III concludes by offering sugges-
tions for policymakers about institutional ways to better insulate courts 
from capture. 
I. CAPTURE OF AGENCIES/CAPTURE OF COURTS 
Scholars have long been fascinated with the prospect of regulatory 
capture, yet literature on the capture of federal courts is virtually nonexist-
ent.46 Why have scholars devoted so much time and energy to studying the 
capture of federal agencies but ignored the same phenomenon within the 
federal judiciary? At first glance the answer is easy: capture occurs in feder-
al agencies, not in federal courts. There is some support for this view-
point.47 
This Article calls into question that common presumption and asks two 
unexplored questions about court capture. First, does the theory of regulato-
ry capture apply to the federal courts? Second, has this theoretical court cap-
ture ever occurred? This Article answers both questions in the affirmative. 
A. The Theory of Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture is a branch of collective action theory.48 In the 
market for government regulation, small, motivated groups have distinct 
advantages over larger, but less enthusiastic, groups. Small groups of inter-
ested individuals can easily motivate their members to vocally support leg-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Posner, supra note 7, at 19–20; Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An 
Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 764 
(1979) (“Public choice theory can be used to probe the mechanics of adjudication . . . .”). 
 46 For an example of the voluminous literature on regulatory capture, see generally Stigler, 
supra note 1 (proposing a supply and demand model for regulation). On the lack of a similarly 
voluminous literature about the prospect of court capture, see generally Epstein, supra note 7. 
 47 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 48 For more on collective action theory, see generally Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action Theo-
ry, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 186 (Carles Boix & Susan C. Strokes 
eds., 2007). 
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islative change.49 Large groups, on the other hand, encounter a free-rider 
problem: each member of the group benefits from successful collective ac-
tion, regardless of the individual contribution of each member.50 Thus, each 
member of a large group has little incentive to participate because the cost of 
action is high and provides little benefit to the overall success of the group.51 
Therefore, “[t]here is a systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by 
the small.”52 Special interests can outbid larger groups for regulation, even 
though the special interests’ desires might run counter to the interests of 
society as a whole. 
To use a simplified example, the vast majority of Americans may de-
sire railroads that employ the latest safety devices. The big railroad compa-
nies may have precisely the opposite preference because such safety devices 
may be very expensive and increase their costs of operation. In the end, the 
railroad companies may win, not because they have greater support from 
the public, but because the railroad industry is more motivated to quash any 
legislation mandating new safety devices than the general public is motivated 
to push for safety device legislation. This may be true, even though the num-
ber of people that prefer the safety devices far outnumbers those who do not 
want them and the societal benefits (the value of improved safety devices to 
society) may far outweigh the cost of implementing the new devices. 
Most of the regulations in the United States are issued not by Congress 
but by the numerous federal regulatory agencies that are responsible for 
administrating the laws that Congress passes.53 An industry often may find 
that a particular agency’s rules or regulations affect the industry to a greater 
degree than the laws passed by Congress.54 Those affected industries may 
seek to influence that agency’s decision-making.55 At times, this influence 
may cross over into “capture” where the agency is actually controlled by 
those it is meant to regulate.56 
                                                                                                                           
 49 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 22–36 (1965) (arguing that small groups have a competitive advantage over large 
groups in the search for advantageous regulations); Stigler, supra note 1, at 3; John Shepard 
Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–25 (1986). 
 50 See Ostrom, supra note 48, at 188 (stating that in large groups, participants that are “free 
riding will not be noticed and thus it will not affect the likelihood that the good will be provided”). 
 51 Id. 
 52 OLSON, supra note 49, at 29. 
 53 See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 6–9 (1979) (outlining the law-making role of administrative agencies). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Con-
trol? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 766–67 
(1983). 
 56 See Merrill, supra note 1, at 1043. 
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 While capture is well-established as a concept, the term is difficult to 
pin down with a precise definition.57 Broadly speaking, regulatory capture 
describes the situation where regulators have been co-opted by organized in-
terest groups to adopt policies that run contrary to the public interest.58 Some 
scholars dedicated to this area of law have defined regulatory capture as “the 
results or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or 
repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of 
the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.”59 
Of course, this definition begs for further clarification. How does one 
define the “public interest”? Does the industry include other actors who are 
aligned with the industry’s interests such as trade groups or lobbyists? How 
does one distinguish between capture and other (seemingly) proper forms of 
democratic decision-making? These questions and others have occupied 
administrative scholars for the past fifty years.60 This Article’s goal is not to 
wade into these long-standing debates, but instead this Article presumes the 
existence of capture as a phenomenon and seeks to apply the insights from 
fifty years of administrative scholarship to the federal courts.61 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: 
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 1, at 1, 13 (“Many of capture 
theory’s problems boil down to the lack of a clear definition for the central concept.”). Perhaps 
this definitional problem is the result of the multitude of ways in which capture is thought to oc-
cur. See KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY 341 (1986) (“Just as there is no single theory of the origins of regulatory capture, there 
is no single explanation of how capture is perpetuated.”). Regardless, the theory of regulatory 
capture has played a major and influential role in administrative law literature. See Lawrence G. 
Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 175–76 (2011) (describing the wide-scale acceptance of capture 
theory). 
 58 Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1343 (2013) (“Agency capture is a special case, where regulators 
within the bureaucracy have been influenced by organized special-interest groups to adopt policies 
that are out of line with the broad public interest.”). 
 59 Carpenter & Moss, supra note 57, at 13. 
 60 See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative 
Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 565, 565 (1970). 
 61 On this point (whether capture is a real phenomenon), an overwhelming majority of schol-
ars agree that it is. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) (sug-
gesting a body within the white house to monitor for capture), https://repository.law.
umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1574&context=articles; Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Cap-
ture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 206–210 (2006) (reviewing the broad regula-
tory capture literature in economics); Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/34, Jan. 2006) (reviewing the literature on regulatory 
capture of financial agencies). But see William D. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory of 
Regulation: The Case of State Public Utility Commissions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 524, 524–25 
(1984) (challenging the capture theory of regulation and reviewing other literature that raise simi-
lar challenges); Paul Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Ade-
quate—and Less Pessimistic—Theory of “Clientele Capture,” 6 POL’Y SCIS. 301, 325–26 (1975) 
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1. How Regulatory Capture Occurs 
Regulatory capture occurs when a regulator’s objectivity has been 
compromised by a close relationship between the regulator and the regulat-
ed or the financial situation of the regulator in relation to the regulated. 
While capture can occur through corruption, it can also happen in less obvi-
ous ways, such as when a regulator receives a job offer from a company 
which he or she regulates, or through a “revolving door” between the agen-
cy and the regulated industry.62 Agencies, however, are also subject to other 
forms of capture. When an interest group is the sole possessor of infor-
mation necessary to an agency, the interest group can capture the industry 
by revealing only that information that is favorable to industry.63 Cultural 
capture, where the informal influence of an industry along with the interper-
sonal relationships among agency employees, is a more amorphous type of 
capture but likely greatly influences regulators.64 This subsection will brief-
ly describe the types of regulatory capture that have been identified by 
scholars, before applying the literature to courts. 
a. Classic Forms of Capture: Bribes, Jobs, and Campaign Contributions 
Capture can occur either as a result of overly cozy relationships be-
tween the regulator and the regulated, or financial entanglements that com-
promise a regulator’s objectivity.65 There are numerous ways in which a 
                                                                                                                           
(arguing that agency actors are not passive and can avoid the pressures of capture by “disseminat-
ing technical information and encouraging input” from interested stakeholders).  
 62 See Baxter, supra note 57, at 197 (describing the revolving door as “unavoidable” and 
“desirable”); Dror Etzion & Gerald F. Davis, Revolving Doors? A Network Analysis of Corporate 
Officers and U.S. Government Officials, 17 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 157, 158–60 (2008) (analyzing 
staffing in the G.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies and finding a high rate of turnover). 
 63 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1321 (describing “information capture” as interest groups 
overwhelming the administrative system with complex information which leads to decision-
making processes occurring in the dark). 
 64 See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATO-
RY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 1, at 71, 76–77 
(analyzing the debate about whether cultural capture theory is “a critique or an offshoot of capture 
theory”). 
 65 For an overview of this expansive literature, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991) (analyzing public choice theory and its possible ap-
plications); Barkow, supra note 6 (identifying five equalizing factors that are well-suited to ad-
dress the problem of capture); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intru-
sive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991) (analyzing proposals for more intrusive judicial 
review based on the theory that judges will act in their own self-interest); Jerry L. Mashaw, The 
Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1989) 
(analyzing public choice doctrine in public law); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellec-
tual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 
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federal agency can fall under the influence of a regulated industry.66 The 
first and the most obvious way involves the industry achieving favorable 
regulations via gifts or bribes to the employees of the agency.67 Fortunately, 
such actions are rare.68 Nevertheless, they represent perhaps the clearest 
example of the influence that the regulated industry can have on the regula-
tor (the agency). 
A modern example of this “you-scratch-my-back” arrangement is that 
of the Minerals Management Service (MMS), a now-defunct agency of the 
Department of the Interior charged with supervising off-shore drilling activ-
ities.69 In two investigations by the Department of the Interior Office of In-
spector General, MMS was found to have accepted bribes and excessive 
gifts from representatives of a drilling company.70 Furthermore, agency em-
ployees engaged in sexual conduct and drug use with their industry coun-
terparts.71 Also, an agency employee inquired about the possibility of ob-
taining a job at a private company while simultaneously making regulatory 
decisions about that company. This action appears to have compromised the 
agency employee’s willingness to cite the company for non-compliance.72 
The actions of MMS employees were scrutinized after the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill killed eleven people and resulted in pouring 210 million 
                                                                                                                           
33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2010) (analyzing intellectual hazard in the 2008 financial crisis 
and offering solutions to address the risk going forward). 
 66 See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 57, at 341 (“Just as there is no single theory of the 
origins of regulatory capture, there is no single explanation of how capture is perpetuated.”). 
 67 See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 6, at 1090–91 (arguing that interest groups have five pri-
mary means to influence government policy: bribes, future employment for government decision-
makers, personal relationships with government workers, refraining from criticizing the govern-
ment, and political contributions); Daniel Schwartz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Em-
powerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY 
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra note 1, at 365, 365–66 
(listing bribes, promises of future employment, and political contributions as potential means of 
capture). 
 68 Schwartz, supra note 67, at 365 (“[M]onetary bribes are feasible, although not common.”). 
 69 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 3 (2010), https://www.boem.gov/uploaded
Files/2011BudgetJustification.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6V4-RUD5]. 
 70 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE RE-
PORT: MMS OIL MARKETING GROUP – LAKEWOOD 5–8 (2008), https://www.doioig.gov/sites/
doioig.gov/files/RIKinvestigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GAL6-WJPU]. 
 71 See id. at 7 (“During the course of our investigation, we learned that some RIK employees 
frequently consumed alcohol at industry functions, had used cocaine and marijuana, and had sexu-
al relations with oil and gas company representatives.”). 
 72 See id. at 9–16 (summarizing an investigation into the gifts provided by the oil industry to 
an MMS employee, and that employee’s assistance in correcting a mistake made by a Chevron 
employee that “could have cost [him] his job”). 
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gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.73 Media outlets, including the New 
York Times and Washington Post, cited to the story as an example of cap-
ture: the agency’s “cozy ties to industry” led to a regulatory failure.74 
But there are less corrupt ways that capture can occur.75 Capture can 
occur when the individual regulator is hoping for a job or receives a job 
from a company that she is simultaneously regulating.76 The industry pro-
vides regulators with something that regulators desire (high-paying jobs) in 
exchange for favorable regulations or lax enforcement of existing regula-
tions.77 The lure of future employment is well-documented in many indus-
tries.78 Ronald J. Fox, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, said that 
the “revolving door” affects supervisory decisions in defense procurement: 
The availability of jobs in industry can have a subtle, but debili-
tating effect on an officer’s performance during his tour of duty in 
a procurement management assignment. If he takes too strong a 
hand in controlling contractor activity, he might be damaging his 
opportunity for a second career following retirement. Positions 
are offered to officers who have demonstrated their appreciation 
for industry’s particular problems and commitments.79 
Agency employees frequently rotate between government and indus-
try.80 When one administration takes over from another, one set of employ-
ees might enter government positions while another set might do the oppo-
                                                                                                                           
 73 Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html [https://perma.
cc/Q7SA-S3PH]. 
 74 Juliet Eilperin & Scott Higham, How the Minerals Management Service’s Partnership with 
Industry Led to Failure, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406754.html [https://perma.cc/4QY6-98SN]; Ian Ur-
bina, Inspector General’s Inquiry Faults Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2010), http://www.ny
times.com/2010/05/25/us/25mms.html. 
 75 See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 6, at 1090–91 (arguing that interest groups have five pri-
mary means to influence government policy: bribes, future employment for government decision-
makers, personal relationships with government workers, refraining from criticizing the govern-
ment, and political contributions). 
 76 See, e.g., Dal Bó, supra note 61, at 205–12 (reviewing the broad regulatory capture litera-
ture in economics).  
 77 See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 
(1975) (discussing this implication). 
 78 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 6, at 46–47 (stating that the revolving door “is often cited as 
one of the reasons why the SEC failed” to police financial industries during the economic crisis); 
Cohen, supra note 15, at 689–90 (discussing the evidence of revolving door capture at the FCC). 
 79 ADAMS, supra note 16, at 82 (quoting J. Ronald Fox, the former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense). 
 80 See, e.g., Etzion & Davis, supra note 62, at 158–60 (analyzing staffing in the G.W. Bush 
and Clinton presidencies and finding a high rate of turnover). 
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site. There is nothing inherently corrupt about this practice, and, in fact, it 
may benefit the public by having regulators with real knowledge of the in-
dustry they are regulating.81 But the allure of future employment can be 
enough to affect regulatory decisions, at least on the margins. Scholars and 
policy makers are conscious of the favoritism that may develop with regula-
tors who will soon take jobs with the regulated industry.82 
Another species of capture concern revolves around congressional 
funding of agencies. Scholars of this form of capture study how Congress—
which controls agency budgets—may become beholden to certain lobbyists 
or financial supporters who then exert their influence over particular agen-
cies.83 Because agencies depend on Congress for their funding, they may 
fall victim to the so-called “iron triangle,” in which interest groups, agen-
cies, and Congress form stable, mutually beneficial partnerships.84 Under 
this formulation of the capture story, capture may occur because congres-
sional committees provide agencies with funding;85 in exchange for receiv-
ing the budget that it requested, the agency must be responsive to policy 
demands from Congress;86 and agencies may provide interest groups with 
favorable regulations in exchange for political support in Congress.87 This 
three-way relationship (Congress-Agency-Interest Groups) forms the iron 
triangle. In this sense, the revolving door story is very much a part of the 
iron triangle story because the promise of future jobs is often what the in-
dustry provides to agency personnel.88 
The public is generally uninformed about the agency’s motives in issu-
ing favorable regulations to industry because most regulations are technical, 
esoteric, and not of great interest to the majority of voters.89 Because of 
voter disinterest, Congress’ ability to use its budgeting power to control 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Baxter, supra note 57, at 197 (describing the revolving door as “unavoidable” and 
“desirable”). 
 82 See id. at 197–98 (reviewing proposals from Congress and scholars to reduce the revolving 
door). 
 83 See, e.g., Peltzman, supra note 1, at 215–16 (also constructing early versions of iron-
triangle capture); Stigler, supra note 1, at 3 (constructing early versions of iron-triangle capture). 
 84 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 58, at 1343; see also ADAMS, supra note 16, at 90; DODD 
& SCHOTT, supra note 16, at 103; WOOD & WATERMAN, supra note 16, at 18–28 (discussing 
empirical controversies in the clash between politics and bureaucracy and the principal-agent 
model of bureaucracy). See generally Harrington, supra note 2 (discussing potential capture con-
cerns with the interstate commerce commission). 
 85 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 58, at 1343 (describing the iron triangle as a series of 
“stable, mutually beneficial alliances”). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. at 1344 (making the case that agencies provide regulations in exchange for “political 
support in Congress and perks such as postgovernment jobs”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. at 1343–44. 
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agencies remains unchecked.90 For the same reasons, the executive does not 
adequately supervise agencies that may have become captured via the iron 
triangle.91  
Scholars have also discussed more subtle mechanisms for how interest 
groups influence agencies, including the control of information,92 manipula-
tion of how questions are posed to agencies,93 and thick, interlocking per-
sonal and professional networks that include both agency personnel and 
outsiders.94 
One of the best studied examples of iron triangle regulatory capture in-
volves the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), a now defunct regula-
tory agency.95 The ICC was created initially as an anti-railroad agency, 
meant to control what many viewed as excessive and unfair prices in the 
rail industry.96 Instead of insuring competitive business practices, however, 
critics contend that the ICC was doing the bidding of the railroads, setting 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284–85 (2006) (describing the political branches as “attuned to the 
interests of those narrow interest groups”). 
 91 See id. 
 92 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 90, at 1285 (discussing the possibility that “the more one-
sided th[e] information, support, and guidance, the more likely that agencies will act favorably 
toward the dominant interest group”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1685–86 (1975) (detailing explanations of industry orienta-
tion though control of information). 
 93 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 218 (2003) (dis-
cussing the “disproportionate and self-serving influence that the relatively powerful tend to exert” 
through informal control). 
 94 See Kwak, supra note 64, at 76–81 (discussing subtle influence exerted over regulators’ 
frames of reference); see also Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study 
of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 151 (2011) (“[A]t least some 
publicly important rules that emerge from the regulatory state may be influenced heavily by regu-
lated parties, with little to no counterpressure from the public interest.”). 
 95 See generally RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE 
RAILROAD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF REGULATORY POLICY (1991). 
 96 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.) (mandating that all railroad services be provided for “a reasonable and just” 
charge). When the commission attempted to set maximum shipping rates, however, several rail-
roads challenged the commission’s authority to regulate. The ensuing judicial decisions from 
those challenges severely curtailed the ICC’s powers. See ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. 
Pac. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 511 (1897) (holding that the scope of an agency’s authority is deter-
mined by the agency’s organic statute, and the ICC’s organic statute does not (either implicitly or 
explicitly) include the power to set shipping rates). Because the Supreme Court found that the ICC 
lacked legislative authority to set rates, the early years of the ICC were uneventful. Soon, howev-
er, Congress authorized the ICC to set rates, thereby greatly increasing the power and value of the 
agency. See Safety Appliance Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531; Safety Appliance Act of 
March 2, 1903, ch. 976, 32 Stat. 943; Safety Appliance Act of April 14, 1910, ch. 160, 36 Stat. 
298. 
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the shipping rates at levels that ensured new competitors were starved for 
cash.97 The ICC started out as a means of controlling the powerful railroads, 
but soon turned into a tool of the railroad industry to enact policies that it 
favored.98 Attorney General William Miller, in response to a request to dis-
band the ICC from President Cleveland, said, “The Commission is . . . of 
great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government 
supervision of the railroads, while at the same time that supervision is al-
most entirely nominal.”99 The example of the ICC serves as a warning 
about the pitfalls of iron triangle capture.100 When an agency fails to regu-
late an industry and instead serves to thwart competitors from entering, the 
agency is effectively worse than nothing: the preferable outcome for the 
public would be no regulation at all. 
b. The New Regulatory Capture: Informational and Cultural Capture 
A different version of the capture story motivates another group of 
scholars in administrative law. For these scholars, capture arises from the 
unique pathologies associated with the bureaucratic nature of federal agen-
cies.101 Underfunded and overworked staff may simply not have sufficient 
resources to locate the facts needed to regulate properly, resulting in an 
overly-heavy reliance on industry to identify problematic practices.102 This 
group of scholars sees capture as an informational problem: agencies are 
captured when an interest group is the sole possessor of information that is 
necessary for the agency to make informed regulatory decisions.103 
                                                                                                                           
 97 MILTON FREIDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 29 
(2009) (“[T]he ICC, which started out as an agency to protect the public from exploitation by the 
railroads, has become an agency to protect railroads from competition by trucks and other means 
of transport . . . .”). 
 98 See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM 41 (1989). 
 99 Thomas Frank, Politics Will Undermine Regulation Plan, MARKETPLACE (June 18, 2009), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2009/06/18/business/fallout-financial-crisis/politics-will-undermine-
regulation-plan [https://perma.cc/J4MG-W8LB]. 
 100 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
194 (1990). 
 101 See NEAL SHOVER ET AL., ENFORCEMENT OR NEGOTIATION: CONSTRUCTING A REGULA-
TORY BUREAUCRACY 134–35 (1986) (listing lack of agency funds, lack of skilled experts, and 
congressionally mandated deadlines as encouraging capture). 
 102 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1321 (describing “information capture” as interest groups 
overwhelming the administrative system with complex information which leads to decision-
making processes occurring in the dark). 
 103 See Livermore and Revesz, supra note 58, at 1372 (noting that disclosure requirements can 
lead to “information overload” at the agency); see also Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and 
Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 357, 398 (2010) (“[T]he president attempting to manage regulatory government looks 
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Additional versions of this informational asymmetry capture story arise 
with slightly varied facts. For example, some scholars describe the regulated 
industry as supplying an overwhelming amount of information, leaving regu-
lators dependent on industry to supply relevant information.104 Alternative-
ly, some of the information that agencies need to make an informed regula-
tory decision may be shielded from public view, insulating both the industry 
and the agency from public oversight and criticism.105 
This version of capture as an informational problem is rooted in collec-
tive action concerns.106 Information capture drives up participation costs for 
some groups, like those concerned with the public interest, while advantag-
ing larger groups within the industry that control the information.107 Some 
scholars have written about the various problems that can arise from infor-
mation capture, including excessive, undigested facts at the agency level, 
discussions that take place at too high of a level, and discussions that delve 
into the minutiae of the regulatory decision.108 To these scholars, the solution 
to information capture is the creation of “filters,” which allow the regulatory 
creation process to remain open to all interested parties.109 In this way, deci-
sion-makers have the optimal quantity and quality of information.110 At the 
same time, these transfers of information would have to occur with public 
scrutiny if they were to be effective.111 
Although information capture leads to similar results as other types of 
capture, the mechanisms by which information capture occurs are quite dis-
tinct.112 In classic versions of the capture story, the industry must seek mal-
                                                                                                                           
out over a vast enterprise comprising a huge portfolio of economic, health, safety, and social is-
sues . . . .”). 
 104 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1321 (describing “information capture” as interest groups 
overwhelming the administrative system with complex information which leads to decision-
making processes occurring in the dark). 
 105 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law 
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 977–78 (2014) (arguing that the U.S. 
Trade Representative is likely to be captured because it is exempt from the bulk of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act). 
 106 See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBIL-
ITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 29–52 (2008) (providing an overview of public choice 
concerns regarding collective action barriers). 
 107 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1334–35 (arguing that information costs “drive up the cost of 
participation and simultaneously lower the payoff, at least to public interest groups that will find it 
increasingly difficult to translate the issues into tangible public benefits”). 
 108 Id. at 1335. 
 109 Id. at 1419–22. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1336. 
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leable agency employees who thereinafter do the bidding of the industry.113 
In contrast, information capture does not require that the agency employee 
be conscious of his or her capture. In the case of information capture, the 
regulator may be unable to locate the information required to make a deci-
sion that benefits the public. Information capture fits nicely within the tradi-
tional literature on capture because, as with other forms of capture, well-
funded special interest groups have been able to control the regulatory pro-
cess at the expense of the broader public.114 
A more recent scholarly discussion focuses on cultural and behavioral 
forces as the cause of the capture phenomenon, as opposed to personal ben-
efits or information.115 Distinct from “informational capture,” this form of 
capture is more concerned with the informal influence of industry and the 
interpersonal relationships of agency employees.116 Cultural capture schol-
ars assume that regulators are subject to the prevailing ideas of their social 
group, which group may consist of individuals in the very industry to be 
regulated. As one scholar suggests, “[t]he agency might come to see the 
world the way that its regulated entities do.”117 Ultimately, cultural capture 
may be an offshoot of capture theory, or a deconstruction of the topic.118 
But the precise theoretical contours of cultural capture are beside the point: 
capture can occur in ways other than through self-interested agency em-
ployees. As described in the New York Times, “These men and women may 
believe they are doing their best, but their worldview is affected by the peo-
ple they interact with.”119 
Cultural capture—because it relies upon personal relationships rather 
than money or jobs—is much harder to pin down than more traditional forms 
of capture. For example the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NY Fed) 
was accused of having been captured in the events that culminated in the fi-
nancial collapse of 2008.120 The then-President of the NY Fed, Timothy Geit-
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 114 Id. at 1334–42 (discussing information capture’s fit within the extant capture literature). 
 115 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 61; Kwak, supra note 64, at 75–80; Brett McDonnell & Dan-
iel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2011).  
 116 See Kwak, supra note 64, at 75–80; see also McDonnell & Schwartz, supra note 115, at 
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 119 Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 11, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-
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ner, had long term friendships with Wall Street bank managers and hedge 
funds managers.121 Then, when the financial crisis happened, Geitner bro-
kered a deal with many of those same bank managers and hedge funds, result-
ing in a massive taxpayer bailout.122 This may have been the result of tradi-
tional capture—Geitner had ties to the banks and therefore it was in his finan-
cial best interest to save the banks—but it was more likely a case of cultural 
capture if any capture existed at all. Geitner’s views on the importance of the 
banking system largely mirrored those of the bankers and hedge fund manag-
ers with whom he associated, but it is impossible to say whether that was due 
to friendships with those bank managers or whether Geitner held those views 
independent of his connections.123 Cultural capture theory is based on the 
common sense idea that we are influenced by our friends. 
Cultural capture, like information capture, does not rely on self-
interested agency employees trying to make as much personal gain as pos-
sible.124 It provides an alternative explanation for how capture can occur. It 
operates by leveraging one’s personal beliefs and relationships.125 It is 
premised upon identity, status, and relationships, and therefore can be near-
ly impossible to empirically observe.126  
2. Regulatory Capture Applied to the Federal Courts 
Although agencies differ from federal courts along a multitude of di-
mensions,127 those differences do not preclude capture from occurring in the 
                                                                                                                           
said-to-weigh-steps-to-prevent-regulatory-capture-by-banks [https://perma.cc/6BHU-8GDE] (dis-
cussing the view held by lawmakers that the Fed was “too cozy” with Wall Street). 
 121 Jo Becker & Gretchen Morgenson, Geithner, Member and Overseer of Finance Club, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/business/27geithner.html. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id.  
 124 Kwak, supra note 64, at 79. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 79–81. 
 127 Administrative agencies come in many shapes and sizes, but in general they may act like 
miniature governments. They possess the power to legislate by setting substantive rules, enforcing 
those rules, and adjudicating disputes about those rules. Courts, on the other hand, do not possess 
the power to legislate or enforce the law. Instead, they merely have the power to hear cases or 
controversies. This major difference between administrative agencies and federal courts may have 
discouraged academics from advancing capture theory onto the courts. After all, court capture 
would appear to be ineffective since courts do not have the power to set rules for entire industries 
or enforcement powers against violators of said rules. 
 But the fact that courts lack the power to legislate is not a reason to think that courts will not 
be targets of capture. Federal courts hear incredibly important cases that can be worth hundreds of 
millions or even billions of dollars to companies. To think that such power would not attract the 
interest of industry is wrong. Special interests will attempt to influence any organization with 
power to affect its interests, regardless of the type of organization. 
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courts.128 In the end, both courts and agencies are governmental bodies that 
often deal in matters of great interest to industry. Capture theory predicts 
that where there is value to special interests, there is potential for capture.129 
The traditional model of capture is premised on the expected pecuniary 
benefits to agency personnel.130 In both the revolving door and the iron trian-
gle version of capture, perks (including bribes, money for budgets, nongov-
ernment jobs, etc.) entice a regulator to make favorable decisions to the in-
dustry dangling the perk.131 More modern versions of capture include captur-
ing via information and cultural capture, neither of which require knowingly 
benefitting industry.132 Similarly, a court might receive benefits from capture 
(indirect economic benefits, for example) or it might be completely unaware 
of capture by the industry (cultural capture is a good example of this phe-
nomenon). 
There are differences between courts and agencies that relate to what 
type of “industry” might be attempting to do the capturing. In the agency 
context, the centralization of power over a particular type of rule-making 
tends to attract the interest of a group of companies that share those same 
interests. The Federal Reserve, for example, will attract lobbyists from ma-
jor banks, which are interested in what regulations they will have to follow. 
Conversely, although there is some informal specialization and central-
ization in the federal court system,133 the courts are typically generalists. 
Because of this, there is no central repository for specific types of cases 
(like disputes over financial regulations). Courts may, however, attract an-
other type of special interest that does appear continually before them: the 
litigation industry. The plaintiff and defense bars are powerful organizations 
that clearly have an interest in influencing courts.134 These “industries,” in 
particular, deserve further study as to their ability to capture courts.  
There are two principal reasons that courts and those seeking to influ-
ence courts have been excluded from the literature on capture. Scholars 
generally view courts as politically independent and immune from capture, 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Scholars have raised two primary reasons that capture does not occur at courts: political 
independence and generalized jurisdiction. I deal with those two arguments extensively in Part 
I.B. See infra notes 135–193 and accompanying text.  
 129 See Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 748 (1981). 
 130 See supra notes 65–100 and accompanying text. 
 131 See supra notes 65–100 and accompanying text. 
 132 See supra notes 101–126 and accompanying text.  
 133 See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 522–25 
(2008) (demonstrating that appellate federal judges may informally specialize in what opinions 
they write). 
 134 See Dreyfuss, supra note 35, at 3 (summarizing arguments about the potential for courts to 
be captured “by the bar that regularly practices before them”). 
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and, consequently, they consider courts to be unattractive targets of capture. 
The next section will analyze the soundness of thinking that courts are im-
mune from capture concerns. 
B. The Theory of Court Capture 
In contrast to the wealth of scholarship about regulatory capture, 
scholars have generally ignored courts as a target of capture.135 There have 
been some attempts to theorize about court capture, but those attempts have 
been limited and often focused on state courts.136 To be sure, scholars have 
raised capture concerns in relation to specific specialized courts.137 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,138 landlord tenant 
courts,139 specialized criminal courts,140 specialized antitrust courts,141 
bankruptcy courts,142 and the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
                                                                                                                           
 135 It’s important to distinguish literature about courts becoming captured from literature 
about the courts’ role in ferreting out capture in agencies. The former, which is the concern of this 
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supra note 1, at 1039–43. 
 136 State courts have features that make them more susceptible to capture than federal courts, 
not the least of which is the fact that judges are elected in many states. See, e.g., Helland & Klick, 
supra note 35, at 231–34 (discussing “judicial capture” via state judicial elections by repeat play-
ers such as plaintiffs’ attorneys). 
 137 For a fantastic overview of the literature on specialized courts generally, and the height-
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judicial policy). 
 138 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
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Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1449 (2012) (summarizing arguments that the Federal 
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 139 See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICA-
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eviction-court-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N45-RVHK] (finding that conviction courts failed to 
adhere to the established procedural protocols and found overwhelmingly against tenants); Steven 
Brill, The Stench of Room 202, AM. LAW., Apr. 1987, at 1, 15–18. 
 140 See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting 
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1669 (2012) (stating that specializing criminal courts face 
capture objections based on specialization worries). 
 141 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists Versus General-
ists, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 807 (2013) (“[T]here is undeniably the potential for regulatory 
capture through influence over the selection of judges and, to a lesser extent, over their conduct 
once appointed.”). 
 142 See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 747, 799 (2010) (noting that the notion that the bankruptcy courts have been cap-
tured “has its adherents”). 
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lance Court143 have all been considered susceptible to special interest influ-
ence at one time or another. Yet many of these “courts” are not Article III 
courts.144 Furthermore, all of them maintain specialized caseloads that may 
increase the likelihood of capture.145 Scholars generally consider the gener-
alized federal courts to be free of any serious capture concerns.146 As 
Thomas Merrill has stated: 
Only administrative agencies are subject to the unique patholo-
gies of bureaucracy such as interest group capture. Rival institu-
tions, like the legislature and the courts, [a]re implicitly regarded 
as being immune from these pathologies or at least as suffering 
from them to a significantly diminished degree.147 
There are two primary arguments that scholars rely upon in assuming 
federal court immunity from capture. The first argument is a constitutional 
argument. Federal judges enjoy life tenure and a constitutionally guaranteed 
salary. Thus, scholars assume judges are more politically independent than 
regulators, who are beholden to both the President and to Congress.148 This 
political independence makes judges less reliant on approval from the other 
branches and the special interest influences that work upon those branch-
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lems with Appellate Review in the Leahy Bill?, LAWFARE (July 30, 2014), https://lawfareblog.
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147 Merrill, supra note 1, at 1051. 
 148 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 145.  
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es.149 Also, life tenure insulates judges from the need to search out future 
employment, thereby closing any proverbial revolving door.150 
The second argument is an efficiency-based argument. Judges are con-
sidered poor targets of capture because they cannot influence an industry to 
the degree that agencies can.151 Because courts are decentralized reposito-
ries of cases, courts and judges are less valuable targets of capture.152 Why 
capture one federal judge out of over seven hundred, when capturing one 
regulator can be so much more valuable? 
This section will critique the two common justifications for thinking 
that the federal courts are immune from capture risks. 
1. Political Independence Does Not Shelter Judges from Capture 
Political independence is a primary reason scholars are skeptical of ju-
dicial capture. The argument claims that judges are much more politically 
independent than either the executive or Congress and this independence 
protects the courts from capture because they do not have to worry about 
raising money for reelection, pleasing constituents from a district, or mak-
ing politically unpopular choices.153 Essentially, there are few political re-
percussions for a judge that makes a politically unpopular ruling. 
It is true that agencies are subject to a higher level of political pressure 
than courts.154 Political appointees serve the President and are also closely 
monitored by Congress. Judges, on the other hand, are an independent 
branch of government and their tenure does not depend upon the other 
branches’ approval of their decisions. The courts are, however, dependent 
on Congress for appropriating funds necessary to carry out the work of the 
federal judiciary.155 But this sort of control is much less firm than the con-
trol that Congress and the Executive wield over the heads of agencies.156 
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The Constitution tries to secure judicial independence through (1) 
guarantees of life tenure for judges who serve with good behavior and (2) 
an accompanying unreduced salary.157 These protections are perhaps the 
most often invoked reasons why the judiciary is not susceptible to cap-
ture.158 Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 78, extolled life tenure 
as having the power to shield judges from politics, granting them “complete 
independence.”159 By appointing judges for life, it is thought, many of the 
personal benefits of capture that redound to agency employees are unavail-
able to judges.160 The most obvious potential benefit is the prospect of fu-
ture employment.161 A judge, unlike a regulator, is not interested in what 
employment opportunities exist at the company about which a matter must 
be decided. David Stras and Ryan Scott state the matter thusly: 
[Term limits for judges] would introduce incentives for Supreme 
Court Justices to cast votes in a way that improves their prospects 
for future employment outside the judiciary. . . . It is easy to im-
agine that a young Justice, such as Justice Thomas, who will be 
sixty-one after serving eighteen years on the Court, could have a 
successful “second career” in politics.162 
Although some scholars dispute that life tenure leads to judicial inde-
pendence,163 the majority of scholars who have written about life tenure 
look upon judicial independence as one of the goals of life tenure.164 
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With the greater political pressure that agencies feel, it is logical to 
conclude that they are more likely to be captured than judges. Even so, the 
lessons of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the creation of a 
specialized court to supervise the ICC teach us that just such a state of cap-
ture can arise in courts.165 The United States Commerce Court was a small, 
federal court that was tasked with the duty of hearing challenges from regu-
lations issued by the ICC. By capturing this small court, the railroads dis-
covered a way to restrict competition while at the same time enjoying the 
public perception of regulation.166 
Furthermore, the protection against capture afforded by political inde-
pendence has generally been overstated by scholars. While it is true that 
courts are independent from the other two branches of government, this in-
dependence does not protect courts from the influence of private parties. 
Even if we assume that courts do not experience political pressure, this 
would only shield courts from the type of capture referred to as “the iron 
triangle.”167 Other forms of capture (namely, the revolving door type) can 
exist without political pressure of any sort. In fact, this sort of capture flour-
ishes in the absence of political checks. If a judge is looking for the next 
job, there is nothing that political independence does to stop that judge from 
being biased in favor of potential employers.168 
When scholars speak of judicial independence as protecting courts 
from capture, they often use that term as a short-hand for the life tenure and 
guaranteed salary that judges enjoy. It is these two constitutionally guaran-
teed benefits that scholars have believed protect the federal courts from pri-
vate interests. Judge Richard Posner is among those scholars that believe 
life tenure makes judges far less-susceptible to capture than agencies: 
Execution of valid regulatory policies is often thwarted by the de-
pendence of regulators on information supplied by the regulated 
entities and by the perverse incentives created by “revolving 
door” behavior. The large staffs of most regulatory agencies result 
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in the typical agency-cost problems of bureaucracies that are not 
disciplined by marketplace competition.169 
Here, Judge Posner is arguing that the structure of the federal judiciary 
makes the judiciary less attractive to those trying to exert their influence 
over the courts. Life tenure, by eliminating this “revolving door,” should 
also eliminate the perverse incentives that accompany it, such as working 
for the same industry one used to regulate, not having the necessary infor-
mation to make socially-beneficial decisions, and pay-for-play.170 
It is questionable, however, whether life tenure acts as a capture deter-
rent or is actually an enticement. Some scholars believe that life tenure is a 
means to achieve “partisan entrenchment,” by which they mean political 
parties using life-tenured judges to extend their power beyond their time in 
elected positions.171 It stands to reason that industry would enjoy the same 
long-term benefit by placing sympathetic judges on the bench. Just as polit-
ical parties might seek to capture the nomination process to extend their 
power, so too might an industry seek to capture the same processes and 
place favorable judges on the bench for life. 
Even if we assume life tenure decreases capture risk, there is evidence 
to suggest that it does not eliminate “revolving door” behavior. While guar-
anteeing salary and life tenure make leaving the bench for another job less 
likely, it hardly eliminates the concern. Federal judges are some of the very 
best lawyers in the country; they are likely to attract significant interest 
from law firms. Recently, many judges have been leaving the bench because 
judicial salaries are so far under market.172 A number of judges have retired 
early to increase their salaries in private practice.173 Of course, the relatively 
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small percentage of federal judges that leave the bench in any given year is 
not evidence of a revolving door between the judiciary and private sector 
employment.174 It may, however, signal the weakening of judicial autonomy 
from the private sector. 
Thus, even though judicial retirements do not have a large effect on the 
judiciary as a whole, the concentrated nature of those retirements may raise 
the question of whether post-employment opportunities influenced any de-
cisions.175 If judges know that there are potentially lucrative post-bench 
employment opportunities, regulatory capture theory would suggest that we 
would see many of the same effects on judicial actors that we observe in 
agencies. The specter of future employment has long been a factor that cap-
ture theorists take very seriously.176 There is no reason to think that the pro-
spect of future employment should not influence judges as well as regula-
tors. Capture via employment opportunities may be less a concern in the 
judiciary than in the agency context, but it is a concern nonetheless. 
2. Courts Present Attractive Capture Targets 
The second argument identified by scholars that supposedly shields 
courts from capture centers on the generalized nature of judging. Because 
courts and judges are, generally, unspecialized, some scholars believe they 
are far less appealing targets of capture than agencies. According to Judge 
Posner: 
Agencies are subject to far more intense interest-group pressures 
than courts. The agency heads are political appointees and their 
work is closely monitored by congressional committees. The fact 
that agency members are specialized, and that they are less insu-
lated from the political process than judges are, makes them tar-
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gets for influence by special-interest groups; hence the term “reg-
ulatory capture.”177 
Similarly, Judge Posner feels that specialization of courts makes cap-
ture more likely, but that it remains implausible because of the safeguards 
inherent in the judiciary. According to Posner, “the federal courts are very 
difficult to ‘buy.’”178 Thus, one seeking to buy influence would be better 
served trying to “buy” a high-ranking member of the relevant agency than a 
federal judge. With a federal judge, the random assignment of cases, the 
restrictions on venue, and the number of other federal judges, makes ‘buy-
ing’ any particular judge a losing proposition.179 Despite this, Posner re-
peatedly points to specialization as an invitation to be captured.180 Agencies 
are specialized, courts are not. Therefore, courts are not likely to be cap-
tured, according to Posner.181 
But as Posner notes, federal courtrooms are becoming increasingly 
specialized.182 In patent law, all appeals are heard by a single court of ap-
peals: the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Because 
of this specialization, the Federal Circuit enjoys the attention of nearly eve-
ry patent attorney in the land. This specialization also brings them the atten-
tion of special-interest groups interested in strengthening or weakening the 
patent system.183 The Federal Circuit is a capture target because of its spe-
cialization. Posner and Landes state:  
It was predictable that a specialized patent court would be more 
inclined than a court of generalists to take sides on the fundamen-
tal question whether to favor or disfavor patents, especially since 
interest groups that had a stake in patent policy would be bound 
to play a larger role in the appointment of the judges of such a 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Posner, supra note 7, at 19. 
 178 Id. at 23. 
 179 See Helland & Klick, supra note 35, at 231–32 (stating that the odds of capturing all judg-
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ble to ‘capture’ by the bar that regularly practices before them”). 
2018] Court Capture 1573 
court than they would in the case of the generalist federal 
courts.184 
While Posner acknowledges that specialized appellate courts are “less 
independent” than a generalist court, he still finds the risk of capture at such 
courts to be low.185 Although these specialized courts are centralized and 
therefore may attract special interest influence in a way that generalist 
courts would not, Posner believes the built-in differences between agency 
administrators and judges make agencies juicier targets for special interests 
to capture.186 
Specialization of courts has also been a focus of Lawrence Baum. 
Baum has theorized about the relationship between specialized courts, cap-
ture, and centralization.187 He notes that the CCPA (a forerunner to the Fed-
eral Circuit) was captured by the patent bar.188 By filling the court with 
sympathetic judges, the CCPA became a tool for patent lawyers and patent-
reliant industries.189 Although it is true that courts are more decentralized 
than agencies and therefore present a poor target for parties seeking to cap-
ture the entire judicial branch, it might be the case that specialized courts—
with their increased centralization—could be attractive targets for capture. 
However, Baum downplays the impact of capture within specialized 
courts, generally. For Baum, the “theme of capture should not be overstat-
ed.”190 Capture cannot be presumed to have occurred because the impetus 
for the creation of specialized courts comes from other courts.191 Further-
more, the judges do not benefit from a court being captured. In fact, the ad-
vocates for court specialization were not in a position to directly benefit 
from those courts.192 To Baum, specialized courts do not show evidence of 
capture because the desire for specialized courts is often driven by ideas 
rather than interests.193 
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Baum’s position that capture does not occur with specialized courts is 
based on the specifics of the court’s creation. However, courts can be cap-
tured at any time, not only upon creation. Even though a court may have 
been created with the best of intentions, that fact tells us nothing about 
whether the judges on the court have been captured by a particular interest 
group. And the creation of specialized courts creates attractive targets for 
people interested in capturing legal institutions to harness private gains.194 
Furthermore, generalist courts can present targets for capture as well as 
specialized courts. Cases are not randomly distributed across the country. 
Particular types of cases tend to cluster in certain courts. This clustering 
may occur because the court is located near industry, the court has a reputa-
tion for handling certain types of cases, juries within a particular district are 
thought to be exceptionally adept (or inept, depending on your viewpoint), 
or any number of reasons. The U.S. legal system allows plaintiffs to select 
their court, with personal jurisdiction and venue serving as limiting princi-
ples. But while this might be advantageous to litigants, it may also lead to 
concentration of cases in a particular district. Therefore, while courts are 
less specialized than federal agencies, to say that courts have no value to 
industry because they are not at all specialized would be inaccurate. 
* * * * 
This Article has thus far endeavored to show that court capture is theo-
retically possible, both at specialized courts and at courts of general juris-
diction. The supposed constitutional limits on court capture do not actually 
limit anything, but merely ensure that federal judges cannot be removed 
without cause. If a judge wants to be influenced by certain constituents or 
take a job with a law firm, there is nothing in the constitution that prevents 
such actions. Furthermore, the widespread belief that judges make poor cap-
ture targets because of their decentralized docket accurately describes the 
majority of federal judges; but it is the exceptions we should care about. 
Some judges find that they receive an inordinate amount of a certain type of 
case. Those judges are certainly capture targets. 
So, theoretically, courts could be captured. But has it occurred? The 
following Part analyzes whether there has been evidence of court capture at 
one federal court: the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Tex-
as. The Eastern District of Texas was, until recently, the district court that 
received the most patent litigation in the U.S.—over 40% of cases in recent 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU. L. REV. 1755, 
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years.195 Thus, the patent-related industries (as well as the patent bar) would 
be incentivized to try to capture the court’s decision-making.  
II. COURT CAPTURE IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
As discussed, scholars have dismissed capture as unlikely to occur with-
in the federal courts.196 This dismissal has been based on a series of faulty 
assumptions about courts that this Article has attempted to refute. This Part 
will sketch out which types of capture identified by administrative law schol-
ars are most applicable to courts. It will do so looking to the categories estab-
lished by the regulatory capture literature197 and examining which, if any, of 
these types of captured behavior we can observe in the Eastern District of 
Texas. But first, a word about the Eastern District of Texas. 
A. The Eastern District of Texas 
United States federal district court judges outnumber United States 
federal appeals court judges by almost four to one.198 Assuming a random 
distribution of cases, every district court judge has a very small chance of 
receiving any particular case. For cases on appeal, however, there is a much 
higher chance of any particular federal appellate judge sitting on a case. 
This is due in part to the high number of district court judges compared to 
appellate judges, but also because courts of appeals generally hear cases in 
groups of three judges.199 For someone interested in trying to capture a 
judge, there is more to be gained from capturing an appellate judge than a 
district court judge. 
This should be especially true in patent law. All patent appeals are 
heard by the Federal Circuit, the specialized federal appellate court created 
in 1982.200 Thus, there are only twelve active federal appellate judges that 
are eligible to hear every patent appeal nationwide. At the trial level, over 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See Ryan Davis, Delaware Patent Suits Dwindle as Plaintiffs Flock to EDTX, LAW360 (Feb. 
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670 district court judges can hear patent trials.201 Thus, it would seem that 
any attempt to capture a district court judge would be seen as having little 
effect on the patent system as a whole. But a strange concentration of dis-
trict court patent cases has recently changed the capture calculus. There is 
evidence that court competition—the process of district court judges compet-
ing for litigants—occurs in patent law.202 Indeed, some district judges have 
become increasingly open about their desire to attract patent litigants.203 
No court has been more spectacularly successful in encouraging pa-
tentees to file in its courts than the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Texas. As recently as 1999, the Eastern District of Texas re-
ceived relatively few patent cases, as might be expected for a court with 
only eight active judges and composed entirely of sparsely populated rural 
towns.204 This situation, however, has changed significantly in the past two 
decades. In 2015, the Eastern District of Texas had 2,523 patent cases filed 
in its courtrooms.205 For context, the next most popular court for filing of 
patent cases, the District of Delaware, received 533 new patent cases in 
2015.206 With over one third of all patent cases in the United States heard in 
its courtrooms, the Eastern District of Texas has gained prominence (or in-
famy, depending on your viewpoint) as the favored court for patent cases. 
And one judge in the Eastern District of Texas handles a majority of the 
district’s heavy patent workload.207 Judge Rodney Gilstrap hears a quarter of 
the nation’s patent cases.208 How does one federal district court hear such a 
high percentage of the patent cases nationwide? Depending upon who you 
ask, it may be because of East Texas’s notoriously friendly juries,209 judges 
who are “[k]nowledgeable, [w]elcoming, and [o]rganized,”210 plaintiff friend-
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ly procedural rules,211 unwillingness to transfer cases to a more convenient 
district court,212 differences in substantive law rulings,213 or a host of other 
reasons.214 But much of the Eastern District’s attraction to patent litigants has 
been achieved by eliminating the safeguards that insulate courts from capture. 
For example, the Eastern District of Texas has effectively eliminated random 
assignment of cases, allowing litigants to “judge shop.”215 This and other pro-
cedural changes have made the Eastern District extremely popular with patent 
plaintiffs. Thus, the Eastern District of Texas demonstrates that while the fed-
eral courts may be nominally generalists, certain courts can achieve a high 
concentration of certain cases in their courtrooms. 
B. Evidence of Capture 
At the outset, something rather obvious should be noted. Identifying 
when a court has been captured is a highly speculative endeavor. Judges 
rarely talk about what influences their decision-making process.216 Indeed, 
if a judge had been truly captured by an industry in the hard sense, he would 
do everything in his power to not demonstrate this to the public.217 And it is 
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equally difficult to detect other forms of capture. A judge that has been cap-
tured informationally or culturally is unlikely to even realize that capture 
has occurred.218 This makes the study of capture very difficult to empirical-
ly measure.219 
The detection difficulty, however, should not cause us to completely 
abandon the goal of improving the judicial system. Indeed, the same type of 
empirical evidence is lacking from the regulatory capture literature, yet 
scholars have written copious amounts about the topic. While we may not 
be able to identify court capture with precision, we can outline the broad 
contours of the phenomenon. 
1. Classic Capture 
The classic example of capture in the administrative law literature in-
volves gifts, or payments (bribes) to the agency in exchange for favorable 
rulings.220 Judges are subject to bribes by people trying to influence their 
decisions. Fortunately, the number of instances of a United States federal 
judge getting caught accepting bribes is exceptionally low.221 There are oth-
er types of pecuniary benefits that judges might receive that should raise 
capture alarm bells. They might receive employment after their service on 
the bench, for example, which may influence their decision-making on the 
bench. 
The Eastern District of Texas has seen a dramatic, recent uptick in judg-
es leaving the bench to take employment with law firms. Three of the dis-
trict’s judges, as well as a magistrate judge, have recently left the bench (and 
their constitutionally-mandated salaries) for positions at private law firms: 
Chief Judge Ward became a name partner at Ward & Smith; Chief Judge Da-
vis joined Fish & Richardson; Chief Judge Folsom joined Jackson Walker; 
and Magistrate Judge Charles Everingham IV joined Akin Gump.222 But the 
Eastern District is not alone in judges leaving for patent law firms. Other 
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judges from patent-heavy districts have also retired to become partners at pri-
vate law firms.223 Of course, this alone does not suggest that any of these 
judges were captured by law firms while on the bench. Rather, it highlights 
that life tenure is a one-way street; judges are promised a job for life upon 
good behavior, but that promise merely binds the government’s hands, not the 
hands of the judges. 
More suspect, however, is the tendency of the judges on the Eastern 
District of Texas to join law firms that specialize in patent law.224 None of 
these judges had patent-related experience prior to their elevation to the 
bench.225 This move out of government employment is very similar to that 
of a revolving door between agency and industry.226 When such a high 
number of judges from a relatively small court retire, and all become pri-
vate patent attorneys, it is natural to wonder if those judges were influenced 
by the prospect of employment while they were still on the bench. The con-
cerns from administrative law scholars about the revolving door (expected 
future employment, championing the concerns of industry over the public, 
etc.) are evident in this context. Patent scholars and federal court scholars 
would be well served to pay more attention to these concerns. 
In the iron triangle conception of capture, the agency, Congress, and 
the capturing industry all benefit from the agency being captured.227 The 
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industry controls the agency, the agency gets appropriations from Congress, 
and Congress gets support and money from the industry.228 But this series 
of relationships does not create opportunities to capture federal courts.229 
Because judges enjoy political independence from the other branches, they 
cannot be captured in the traditional way described by scholars who have 
written about the iron triangle.230 The courts’ political independence likely 
inoculates it from this form of capture. Because agencies are so dependent 
on Congress for funding—funding that can be withheld for virtually any 
reason—agencies are keenly aware of what is happening in Congress and 
the ways the political winds are blowing.231 This dependence makes agen-
cies more susceptible to the lure of interest groups lobbying Congress.232 
Courts, on the other hand, basically get the same funding every year regard-
less of Congressional opinion of a particular court.233 Furthermore, the public 
approval of the judiciary far surpasses that of Congress; any attempt to punish 
a court based on its decisions would be highly unpopular with the general 
public.234 Thus, iron triangle capture, or capture that derives from the desire 
to strengthen the judiciary via the other branches, likely does not occur. 
However, a similar form of capture may have occurred that simply cuts 
out Congress. In a way, the Eastern District of Texas has become reliant on 
industry for money and providing the lawsuits that give the district its pres-
tige.235 Meanwhile, some industry players (mainly patent trolls) have be-
come reliant on the Eastern District of Texas to scare alleged patent infring-
ers to settle.236 The district also protects industry against the political tides, 
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insulating it against a hostile Congress, President, and Supreme Court.237 In 
this co-dependent situation, a form of capture that mirrors the iron triangle 
(but with just two nodes) may have occurred. 
Defendants may feel the need to invest in the Eastern District of Texas 
because they find themselves in its courtrooms so often. The cities within 
the district have been the beneficiaries of this largesse. Take Samsung—the 
Korean electronics giant—as an example. The city of Marshall, Texas has a 
skating rink (paid for by Samsung) which greets visitors to the county 
courthouse.238 Marshall and nearby Tyler, Texas residents have received 
over $50,000 per year in scholarships from Samsung.239 Many of the festi-
vals in Marshall are sponsored by Samsung or feature Samsung booths 
which give out high-end electronics to residents.240 Many of the local high 
schools receive Samsung monitors for free or enjoy field trips to Samsung’s 
semiconductor plant in Austin.241 
And it is not just Samsung that feels the need to gain positive press in 
Marshall and elsewhere in East Texas. Weeks before a blockbuster patent 
infringement case was decided by a jury in 2006, Tivo—the developers of 
DVR’s—purchased the Grand Champion Steer (a bull) from the Harrison 
County Cattleman’s Ball for a record price of $10,000.242 Critics com-
plained that Tivo was merely trying to influence the jury pool in a small city 
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of 25,000 people.243 Tivo claims that it was showing its appreciation for the 
hospitality it was shown during the trial.244 Two weeks after the Cattleman’s 
Ball, a jury awarded Tivo $74 million in damages.245  
Even more telling, from a capture perspective, are the various ways 
that the cities of the Eastern District of Texas benefit economically from the 
patent litigation that its judges attract. In Marshall, Texas, at any given time, 
six to ten teams of patent lawyers are preparing for trial.246 The restaurants 
and hotels of Marshall receive steady business because of the litigators that 
are in the district.247 Construction jobs are easy to find as the litigants need 
office space.248 Thus, the judges of the district might feel the need to main-
tain a high flow of litigants. 
Indeed, many of the law firms that the Eastern District of Texas’s 
judges join upon retirement from the bench rely upon the district to contin-
ually attract litigation to the district’s courtrooms.249 These firms would 
likely not survive without the judges’s success in attracting patent cases to 
the Eastern District of Texas.250 Many of these firms would likely have to 
pare down their expenses and resources if there was a significant loss of 
litigation business. This is classic revolving door behavior. 
The capture dynamic that has arguably evolved in the Eastern District 
of Texas thus has a common thread with regulatory capture. The players 
involved on both sides both benefit from the capture. In regulatory capture, 
the agency personnel benefit by the capture dynamic either monetarily, 
through job security, or through connections that they later plan to exploit. 
Similarly, in the court capture scenario, the judges benefit by increasing the 
business opportunities in their local communities. And increasingly in the 
Eastern District of Texas, they directly benefit from the new business op-
portunities (litigation) when they leave the bench for law firms. 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Id. The high school senior who collected the prize money obviously did not share critics’ 
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2. New-Style Capture 
Information capture is perhaps the most conceptually difficult form of 
regulatory capture to analogize to court capture. In the regulatory space, 
informational capture occurs when one industry controls the flow of infor-
mation used by regulators.251 The industry might withhold information (le-
gally) that would have been helpful to a regulator in making an informed 
decision. Or, alternatively, the industry might swamp the agency with in-
formation in an effort to hide some crucial piece of information.252 
Yet in the judiciary, parties are limited in how much information they 
can turn over to the court. Furthermore, they can be compelled to reveal 
very valuable secrets.253 One cannot say that courts are at the mercy of an 
industry in control of the information. The adversarial nature of litigation 
often guarantees that the relevant information will come to light.254 If there 
is information that would be harmful to one side, the other side has every 
incentive to reveal it to the court and not allow the information to be over-
looked.255 There is little evidence for informational capture at the Eastern 
District of Texas. 
The most likely, and least demonstrable, category of capture that might 
apply to the federal courts is cultural capture. Cultural capture occurs when 
regulators give more credence to opinions from their social or professional 
networks than they do to others. In fact, cultural capture is hard to protect 
against because “the mechanisms that produce cultural capture are basic 
features of human interaction.”256 
There are a number of factors that make cultural capture much more 
likely to occur: high similarity between industry and agency (or court) rep-
resentatives, agency (or court) with obvious social purpose, an industry with 
high cultural status, social connections between industry and regulators, and 
technically complex issues.257 The judges of the Eastern District of Texas 
                                                                                                                           
 251 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1321 (describing “information capture” as interest groups 
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are very similar to their counterparts of the patent bar.258 The court itself 
handles important issues of patent and innovation policy that reverberate in 
the business community.259 Members of the patent bar enjoy a high social 
status, and include luminaries from the Supreme Court bar.260 And the court 
deals with highly complex, technical elements of patented products.261 
Of course, the mere fact that a court is a prime target for capture in no 
way proves that the court has been captured. This is among the reasons that 
cultural capture is among the hardest sorts of capture to identify. But the court 
is a target for capture by industry because of the centralization of patent cas-
es. If patent cases were distributed evenly among the federal judicial dis-
tricts, or even amongst the district judges themselves, capture would be 
very unlikely. With the Eastern District of Texas receiving so many patent 
cases, it makes the court a stronger candidate for capture to occur. 
There are many ways in which influence can be peddled to judges. The 
Eastern District of Texas also has close ties with the patent bar that may 
invite cultural capture. Local bar associations are often closely tied with the 
judges that sit in their localities.262 Those associations have an interest in 
increasing the legal work within those localities. Because judges often come 
from those same bar groups and retain friendships and relationships within 
those groups, they may feel a sense of pride in bringing in business for local 
attorneys.263 Many district courts have rules that require local counsel in all 
cases before the court.264 
Patent attorneys are particularly interested in connecting with local 
federal judges since all patent cases are tried in federal court. Thus, local 
patent bars are often well-connected with their local judges. Indeed, many 
judges have commented on the potential benefit of bringing patent cases to 
the local communities.265 The spillover effects that increased litigation has 
on the local community can also extend beyond the legal field. A number of 
cities within the boundaries of the Eastern District of Texas have seen a 
                                                                                                                           
 258 Anderson, supra note 39, at 546–76 (relating the backgrounds of the judges on the Federal 
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E.D. VA. LOCAL CIVIL R. 83.1(D)(1)(b) (2018). 
 265 Anderson, supra note 39, at 546–76; see E.D. VA. LOCAL CIVIL R. 83.1(D)(1)(b). 
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substantial increase in demand for office space and hotel rooms due to the 
visiting attorneys who come to town for trial.266 
For example, the annual Eastern District Bench Bar conference brings 
together patent litigators and the judges on the Eastern District of Texas.267 
Replete with clay pigeon shooting, handgun shooting, and golf (sponsored 
by local law firms), the conference boosts many big names from the patent 
world (in 2016 the conference welcomed judges from the Federal Circuit 
and the PTO commissioner)268 that mingle with the attorneys who attend. 
These annual conferences, centered on the importance of patent law to the 
district, reinforce the understanding that the judges of the Eastern District 
are responsible for bringing business to the district. These types of events 
may lead to cultural capture, because the professional and personal ties that 
develop between the judges and litigants can lead the judges to make deci-
sions about important issues (like venue, motions to transfer, etc.) based on 
the need to keep business local, rather than on the merits of a particular 
case. It is this sort of capture that is most difficult to root out, precisely be-
cause it is based on the “basic features of human interaction.”269 
C. The Eastern District of Texas Exhibits Signs of Capture 
The judges of the Eastern District of Texas exhibit many of the charac-
teristics that administrative scholars have classified as capture. The district 
has a revolving door between law firms and federal judges. The last three 
chief judges of the district have retired from the bench to join prominent 
patent firms in the region. Other judges in the district have also left the 
bench for partnerships with patent law firms. 
Also, the court exhibits a dependence on the patent litigation industry 
for economic benefits to the region. Many of the community amenities of 
the region of east Texas (and especially in the town of Marshall) were fund-
ed in part by major tech companies that often find themselves as defendants 
in the areas courthouses. From ice rinks to state fairs, community life in 
Marshall has the indelible imprint of patent litigation. Private businesses in 
Eastern Texas also depend on the constant churn of patent litigants. The ho-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), 
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tels depend on patent attorneys to keep them afloat; office space rentals de-
pend on the plaintiffs who open up an office in town in order to persuade 
the court that venue is convenient;270 the restaurants offer catered lunches 
for the out-of-town attorneys that are preparing for trial. 
Similarly, the litigation industry depends on the court in important 
ways. Many frequent patent plaintiffs make the court (or a specific judge) 
their court of choice. Non-practicing entities (NPEs, or more pejoratively, 
patent trolls) depend on the Eastern District of Texas and make use of the 
court’s lenient judge selection process. In a world in which every govern-
ment institution seems to despise NPEs (Congress, the Supreme Court, the 
President, the Federal Trade Commission, and to a lesser extent the Federal 
Circuit),271 the Eastern District of Texas offers freedom to operate. Although 
recent changes to the law that have hurt NPE’s business model have perco-
lated down to the Eastern District of Texas, the District is still perceived by 
NPEs as the court of choice.272 Invitations to patent law conferences, speak-
ing engagements before the luminaries of the field, and being feted at the 
District’s own Bench and Bar Association’s conference are just some of the 
perks that come from hearing such a large number of patent cases.  
Of course, one cannot say definitively that the court has been captured. 
The Eastern District of Texas judges are very diligent and are almost uni-
versally well-respected. Despite this, the court exhibits many of the familiar 
signs of capture by industry: a revolving door between industry and bench, 
economic dependence between the region of East Texas and patent litiga-
tion, and the cultural connection between bench and bar. All of this does not 
prove that the Eastern District of Texas has been captured. It does raise con-
cerns, however, that resonate with scholars of regulatory capture.  
III. AVOIDING COURT CAPTURE: SUGGESTIONS 
Is there anything to be done about court capture? Ultimately, any re-
form proposal runs into the realities of human nature: trying to completely 
eliminate bias or favoritism in the court setting is as fruitless an endeavor as 
                                                                                                                           
 270 These offices largely remain vacant throughout the year.  
 271 See Loren Steffy, Patently Unfair, TEXASMONTHLY (Oct. 2014), https://www.texasmonthly.
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eliminating it from all human relationships. Despite the challenges with 
identifying and expunging capture, there are solutions that will greatly re-
duce the chances of courts falling victim to capture. Two potential solutions 
are reforming venue rules and mandating randomized assignment of judges. 
A. Venue Reform 
Court capture is made possible by grouping a large percentage of par-
ticular cases in a certain court. This makes the expense of influencing a 
judge worth the cost for litigants. Otherwise, influencing a single judge that 
only rarely sees cases of a particular type or from a certain industry does not 
indicate that you have captured a court; it merely suggests that one particu-
lar judge thinks favorably about a particular case. While that may be con-
cerning on a micro level, this sort of judicial favoritism does not have major 
implications for the federal courts as a whole. Another judge in another dis-
trict is likely to have an unfavorable opinion of the same industry. Thus, this 
favoritism may alter individual case outcomes, but litigants still can have 
faith that the courts are not systematically biased against them. Further-
more, it is not clear that we could completely inoculate the judiciary from 
outside influences. 
But if a court becomes the predominant court for particular types of cas-
es, the leveling effects of different viewpoints disappears. If a court seeks to 
encourage filings of a particular type of case, we may see that court develop a 
pro-plaintiff bias as a means of attracting litigants.273 Whether this concentra-
tion of cases comes from the specialization of the court (as with the Federal 
Circuit) or through other means (like the Eastern District of Texas competing 
successfully for patent cases), the attraction of capturing courts increases 
dramatically when the court hears a large number of similar cases. 
In the case of the Eastern District of Texas, this concentration of cases 
was made possible, in part, by the venue rules that governed patent cases 
before the Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Food 
Brands.274 Prior to TC Heartland, the venue statute for patent cases allowed 
most patent plaintiffs to file in any district court in the United States.275 
With all ninety-four U.S. district courts to choose from, plaintiffs could se-
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lect the court that they felt offered them the greatest odds of success.276 
When patent plaintiffs select a forum, they are very often going to select the 
district that offers them the most advantages, either from a legal or proce-
dural standpoint.277 The Eastern District of Texas keeps cases filed within 
its district by rarely granting motions to transfer.278 Once a case is filed in 
the Eastern District of Texas, it often remains there.279 Thus the initial 
choice of the plaintiff plays a great role in determining the final outcome of 
a case.280 Therefore, Congress ought to further restrict the venue choices of 
patent litigants.281 Doing so would reduce a court’s ability to amass the spe-
cialization that encourages capture. 
The courts themselves can also reduce some of the ability for general-
ist courts to specialize. Until recently, the Federal Circuit has chosen not to 
interfere with district court venue selection. In fact, before 2008, the Federal 
Circuit consistently interpreted the patent venue statute quite broadly.282 
Prior to December 2008, the Federal Circuit had never, in its twenty-six years 
of existence, reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue.283 
Since 2008, however, the Federal Circuit has taken a much more active inter-
est in venue disputes. The Federal Circuit entered the forum selection fray 
following a decision from the Fifth Circuit overturning the Eastern District 
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of Texas’s denial of a transfer motion in a products liability lawsuit.284 In 
2008 in In re TS Tech USA Corp, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, in a surprise move, granted a mandamus appeal to review a 
denial of a motion to transfer out of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas.285 The court in TS Tech held that the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas abused its discretion in denying a 
motion for transfer, and directed the Eastern District of Texas to transfer the 
case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.286 
Since TS Tech, the Federal Circuit granted mandamus review on seven mo-
tions to transfer within a very short time.287 All but one of the mandamus 
actions have arisen out of the Eastern District of Texas. The outlier involved 
a decision by the Northern District of California to grant a transfer motion 
into the Eastern District of Texas.288 
In line with this Article’s suggestions, the Supreme Court recently re-
stricted the districts in which venue is proper in patent cases. In 2017 in TC 
Heartland v. Kraft Food Brands Group, the Supreme Court of the United 
States re-evaluated the patent venue statute in a case arising out of the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Delaware.289 The case challenged 
a decision from the Federal Circuit holding that the United States District 
Court of Delaware had venue in a dispute between two companies head-
                                                                                                                           
 284 See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Concluding that 
the district court gave undue weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of venue, ignored our precedents, 
misapplied the law, and misapprehended the relevant facts, we hold that the district court reached 
a patently erroneous result and clearly abused its discretion in denying the transfer.”). 
 285 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 286 Id. at 1317–18, 1323. 
 287 See In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Eastern 
District of Texas abused its discretion in denying Microsoft’s motion to transfer the case to the 
Eastern District of Washington); In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (hold-
ing that the Eastern District of Texas did not err in its denial of Vistaprint and OfficeMax’s motion 
to transfer to the District of Massachusetts); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1378–80 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that Eastern District of Texas erred when it denied Zimmer Holdings’ 
motion to transfer to the Northern District of Indiana); In re Nintendo, Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1196 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the Eastern District of Texas’s denial of a motion to transfer the 
case to the Western District of Washington was an abuse of discretion); In re Hoffman-La Roche, 
Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the Eastern District of Texas’s denial of a 
motion to transfer venue to the Eastern District of North Carolina was an abuse of discretion); In 
re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the Eastern District 
of Texas abused its discretion in denying a motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of 
California).  
 288 See In re Aliphcom, 449 F. App’x 33, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Northern Dis-
trict of California did not abuse its discretion in allowing a motion to transfer venue to the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas). 
 289 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
1590 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1543 
quartered elsewhere.290 The Court determined that venue is proper when (1) 
the case is filed in the district within a state in which the defendant compa-
ny is incorporated or (2) the case is filed within a district in which the de-
fendant has a regular place of business and in which acts of patent in-
fringement occurred. TC Heartland will likely make it more difficult for the 
Eastern District of Texas to compete for patent cases.291 If there is a signifi-
cant drop-off in patent filings in the Eastern District of Texas, there will be 
less incentive to try and capture the judges of the district. 
A change in the venue law from Congress would go a long way toward 
eliminating court capture.292 Indeed, Congress is contemplating such a 
change in patent law, as well as in bankruptcy, another area that experiences 
widespread forum shopping.293 Of course, after TC Heartland, much patent 
litigation has simply shifted from the Eastern District of Texas to the Dis-
trict of Delaware because many companies are headquartered in Delaware. 
This of course raises the specter of court capture occurring in Delaware, 
which has a history of such court capture. The Eastern District of Texas is 
less able to for litigation because venue restricts many litigants from filing 
in Eastern Texas. Without the specialization that comes from centralization, 
it is much less likely that courts and judges will be subject to capture; they 
will not be attractive targets because there is no way of knowing ex ante 
which cases they will be able to hear. The safeguards that legal scholars typ-
ically assume prevent capture of courts will be much more relevant. 
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B. Mandate Random Assignment of Judges 
There are ways to eliminate capture that go beyond venue reforms. One 
way that has been suggested in the literature on bankruptcy forum shopping, 
involves randomization of case assignment.294 Non-random case assignment 
is subject to universal condemnation by the courts themselves.295 All circuit 
courts purport to use a randomized system of case assignment.296 However, 
the random assignment of cases is not mandated by statute297 nor the due 
process clause of the constitution.298 Thus, in practice there likely is some-
thing less than a random assignment of cases at virtually all the U.S. Circuit 
Courts and the U.S. District Courts. 
The Eastern District of Texas has continually had case assignment pro-
cedures for patent cases that allow litigants to select the judge who will pre-
side over their case.299 The ability to choose one’s judge has proven to be 
extremely popular for patentees.300 Such an ability to “judge shop” has been 
uniformly decried as antithetical to notions of justice.301 One scholar noted 
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 300 Anderson, supra note 39, at 670–74; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 39, at 255–60. 
 301 See Anderson, supra note 39, at 670–74. 
1592 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1543 
that the ability to “judge shop” was one of the features of Delaware bank-
ruptcy courts that initially appealed to bankruptcy filers.302 It has also been 
cited as a problem in New York’s stop and frisk lawsuits.303 The ability to 
manipulate the judge assigned to one’s case is a practice that should be 
eliminated in the interest of justice.304 
Congress could mandate that district courts randomize assignment of 
patent cases within their districts.305 Limiting the ability of courts, such as 
the Eastern District of Texas, to deviate from random assignment proce-
dures for patent cases would eliminate a court’s ability to attract, or dis-
suade, litigants from filing in that court.306 This in turn would reduce the 
appeal of capturing a judge because securing a judge that is randomly as-
signed cases is far less valuable than a judge that can be selected by the 
plaintffs.307 
Congress could quite easily eliminate the courts’ ability to permit pre-
selection of judges. Under 28 U.S.C. § 137, chief judges of district courts 
have the power to “assign the cases” in accordance with the rules and orders 
of the court.308 The statute grants chief judges broad discretion in assigning 
cases.309 Congress could amend the statute to require that district courts as-
sign cases in a randomized manner among the judges of the district or at 
least in a neutral manner.310 This modification would eliminate one of the 
primary judicial means of attracting litigants with very little cost. Alterna-
tively, the Supreme Court could amend the Rules of Civil Procedure to re-
quire random assignment.311 Such a move by the Supreme Court has the 
                                                                                                                           
 302 See LOPUCKI, supra note 293, at 72–75 (chronicling the moves by bankruptcy courts of 
the District of Delaware to attract plaintiffs). 
 303 See Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the 
Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. 
J. RACE & L. 199, 201–06 (2014) (demonstrating the dangers of manipulating case assignment 
using New York’s stop-and-frisk law as an example). 
 304 See Brown & Lee, supra note 296, at 1066–69 (“A system of neutral assignment merely 
ensures that [judges] were not deliberately placed on the panel to influence the outcome of the 
case.”). 
 305 Id. at 1107 (rejecting the approach that Congress can issue legislation that would mandate 
that cases be assigned in a neutral manner). 
 306 See Anderson, supra note 39, at 555–58 (analyzing the ways in which limits on assign-
ment procedures could be enacted). 
 307 See supra notes 135–193 and accompanying text (describing how agency capture theory 
applies to courts). 
 308 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2012). 
 309 Id.; see also Brown & Lee, supra note 296, at 1090–91 (concluding that there is nothing in 
the statute that “requires neutral assignment”). 
 310 Cf. Brown & Lee, supra note 296, at 1107–08 (outlining Congressional options for achiev-
ing the same neutrality goal for circuit courts). 
 311 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (granting the Supreme Court the power to prescribe general procedur-
al rules for the United States district courts). 
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advantage of allowing the details of assignment procedures to be more fully 
developed by the courts themselves, while at the same time ensuring that cas-
es will be assigned neutrally between the various judges within the district.312 
Mandating randomness of judge assignment would greatly reduce generalist 
courts’ ability to gain a significant concentration of particular cases.313 This 
would have the welcome effect of insulating the courts from capture. 
CONCLUSION 
The capture of courts plays a significant, if under-explored, role in the 
United States’ judicial system. Just as the more traditional regulatory cap-
ture questions federal agencies’ decision-making abilities, court capture 
calls into question the decision-making ability, the neutrality, and the legit-
imacy of courts. But scholars have not seen the connection between regula-
tory capture and the federal judiciary. This lack of concern for court capture 
is due to two supposed judicial checks on capture: the federal judiciary’s 
independence—specifically, federal judges’s life tenure—and the generalist 
nature of the judiciary. But, as this Article has demonstrated, these checks 
on capture are not always effective. For example, judges have political in-
dependence, but that independence does little to shield the court from pri-
vate influence. Furthermore, life tenure guarantees judges a position for life, 
but it does not guarantee that judges will remain on the bench for life. Re-
cent retirements from the bench raise concerns about a revolving door be-
tween the judiciary and private law firms. Lastly, the federal judiciary is 
mainly composed of generalist judges, but increasing specialization (and the 
centralization of case that naturally accompanies specialization) raises con-
cerns about court capture. 
This dynamic can be observed in the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Texas. The Eastern District of Texas has actively competed 
with other district courts for patent cases. Over the last decade, it has been 
astoundingly successful, bringing in over one-third of the patent cases in the 
country to the small, rural district. The bench of the Eastern District of Tex-
as has become very patent-heavy, and in turn, the judges must feel pressure 
from professional relations to bring in business to the district. Court capture 
is a real concern in this court, precisely because the court has been so suc-
cessful at attracting patent infringement plaintiffs. One can’t help but won-
der whether the judges have an eye towards future employment. This state 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See Brown & Lee, supra note 296, at 1108 (making a similar proposal for the Supreme 
Court to amend the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
 313 See generally Anderson, supra note 39, at 670–74 (explaining how the Eastern District of 
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of affairs is troubling for the patent system and the federal judiciary as a 
whole. 
Congress can enact certain reforms to restrain judges from becoming 
captured. The first thing they can do is enact venue reform. The Supreme 
Court recently restricted venue in patent cases in TC Heartland v. Kraft Food 
Brands Group, but that result is being narrowed by the judges of the Eastern 
District themselves. Congress has suggested that venue reform is still on the 
table following TC Heartland. Congress would be well advised to look at 
venue in non-patent cases as well. Second, Congress or the Supreme Court 
should mandate random assignment of cases within a district. Both of these 
changes will protect the federal judiciary from the risk of capture. 
